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n 30 May 2006, the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) held that 
the Passenger Name Records 
(PNR) Agreement between the EU and 
the US on the processing and transfer of 
personal data by air carriers to the US 
was unlawful. Headlines in the UK’s 
Daily Telegraph indicate the 
seriousness with which industry has 
taken the judgment: “EU privacy ruling 
threatens chaos on flights to US” (31 
May 2006). The Financial Times was 
even more alarmist: “EU airline ruling 
puts terror deal in doubt”. Clearly 
something important had happened, 
notwithstanding the fact that the ECJ 
preserved the application of the two 
contested measures until 30 September 
2006, in order to provide time for a new 
agreement to be negotiated.  
The EU institutions also acted with 
alacrity: on 19 June the European 
Commission proposed to the Council 
that the institutions send a joint letter to 
the US authorities denouncing the PNR 
agreement as of 30 September 2006 and 
enter into a new agreement in the same 
form but under a new legal base, no 
longer subject to the European 
Parliament’s effective scrutiny. Anyone 
who has followed EU affairs will be 
familiar with the contrast here to the 
normal, fairly slow approach of the 
Commission to a perceived need to 
change a law. Such a rapid reaction 
indicates the seriousness of the 
situation.  
However, the PNR agreement has not 
been the only route by which the US 
authorities have been seeking ways to 
obtain personal information about EU 
citizens. The US authorities have also 
bilaterally negotiated measures to gain 
access to banking information about EU 
citizens’ transactions and actively 
opposed further EU measures to protect 
data subjects. All this activity around 
personal data evidences serious political 
differences about the relationship of the 
individual and the state between the EU 
and US regarding the collection, 
storage, use and manipulation of data. 
So what is the political life of data 
which has so galvanised both EU and 
US institutions? 
In this briefing paper we will outline: 
1.  The EU-US agreement – its extent 
and scope 
2.  The ECJ judgment – its meaning 
3.  The wider implications for the 
architecture of the EU 
4.  The data protection question 
5.  Remedies for the aggrieved 
individual 
6.  Some recommendations to resolve 
the structural problems raised by 
the decision. 
We address three critical issues in this 
note. The first is how the current 
architecture of the EU is failing to 
deliver the legal certainty that is critical 
to the EU’s foreign relations and 
international standing and what needs to 
be done to improve it; secondly, the 
European legal norms on data 
protection and how they should be 
reconciled in the light of very different 
US considerations; and thirdly the right 
of the aggrieved individual to a remedy 
in the case of illegal data processing. 
The EU-US agreement 
Since January 2003, European airlines 
flying into the United States are obliged 
to provide the US customs authorities 
with electronic access to the data 
contained in their automated reservation 
and departure control systems, referred 
to as ‘Passenger Name Records’ 
(hereinafter ‘PNR data’). Based on US 
laws adopted following the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11, airline companies 
should submit these data before or 
immediately after the airplane takes off. 
If they fail to do so, they can be fined a 
maximum of $5,000 for each passenger 
whose data have not been appropriately 
transmitted. The PNR data comprise 34 
fields of data, including not only name 
and address, but also contact details 
such as telephone numbers, email 
address, information on bank numbers 
and credits cards, and also on the meals 
ordered for the flight.  
Initially, based on information of the 
European Commission that this 
requirement would be in breach of 
national laws and Community 
legislation, including the EC Directive 
95/46 on data protection and the code of 
conduct for computerised reservation 
systems, the US authorities were willing 
to postpone the entry into force of the 
new provisions. However, after 5 March 
2003, they refused to waive the right to 
impose penalties on airlines failing to 
comply with the legislation on 
electronic access to PNR data. After this 
date, the European airline companies 
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found themselves, as expressed at that 
time by a Member of the European 
Parliament, ‘between a rock and a hard 
place’. If they conform to the applicable 
EC rules and refuse US authorities 
access to the PNR data, they would risk 
a fine from the US authorities and if 
they transmit the data in breach of data 
protection laws, they would risk a fine 
by the national data protection 
authorities in the EU. The European 
Commission tried to escape from this 
dilemma by adopting, after having 
negotiated with the US officials, a 
decision on adequacy based on Article 
25 of the EC Directive on data 
protection. By taking this decision, the 
Commission expressed its conviction 
that the US would ensure an adequate 
level of data protection. This decision 
enabled the Council to adopt the 
Agreement of 17 May 2004 between the 
European Community and the United 
States of America. 
The adoption of this agreement was 
highly disputed not only because of the 
disregard of the Council and 
Commission for the position of the 
European Parliament, but also because 
of the widespread concerns for the data 
protection rights of EU passengers. For 
example, the European Data Protection 
Working Party (based on Article 29 of 
the EC Directive 95/46) repeatedly 
raised its doubts on the proportionality 
of transfer of PNR data and on the level 
of protection as guaranteed in the 
undertakings of the US Bureau of 
Customs and Borders Protection (CBP). 
Other concerns dealt with the fact that 
the transfer of data was based on a 
‘pull’ instead of ‘push’ system, which 
means the US authorities have 
immediate access to the electronic 
systems of the airline companies, 
instead of being dependent on the 
companies to provide them with the 
information.
1  
In September 2005, a US-EU team 
conducted a joint review in 
Washington, D.C. on the 
implementation by the US CBP of the 
Undertakings as set out in the 
                                                 
1 In the Undertakings between the Commission 
and US officials, it has been agreed that the 
‘pull’ system would only persist until such 
time as air carriers are able to implement a 
system to ‘push’ the data to CBP. According 
to promises made to the Commission a full 
functioning of the ‘push’ system would be in 
place by the end of 2005. 
Commission Decision 2004/535 of 14 
May 2004.
2 The EU team was 
composed by Commission officials, a 
member of OLAF, two representatives 
of national data protection authorities 
(Germany and the UK) and law 
enforcement authorities.
3 In the report 
on the Joint Review, the EU team 
expressed its disappointment at the fact 
that based on “understandable concerns 
about law enforcement sensitivities”, 
limitations were imposed on the number 
of records that could be accessed by the 
EU team and on the provision of hard 
copy versions of certain staff procedural 
guidance. This meant, according to the 
EU team, that the review report was 
written “in the context of those 
limitations” and thus should be read in 
this perspective. The EU team found 
these limitations particularly regrettable 
as, according to the report, “all the 
members of the EU team were required 
to sign confidentiality agreements 
exposing them to criminal sanctions for 
any breach”. In general, the EU team 
found a “substantial” compliance with 
the Undertakings as of the date of the 
Joint Review (20 and 21 September 
2005). However this has been described 
as a “late compliance” as the PNR 
Agreement already entered into force on 
28 May 2004. Until mid-May 2005, the 
EU team concluded that there was not a 
sufficient degree of compliance. 
According to the report, the Privacy 
Office of the Department of Homeland 
Security could not provide the EU team 
with concrete reasons why it took CBP 
such a long time to implement the 
Undertakings. For example, the EU 
team found that only on 15 March 2005 
the CBP implemented a filtering system 
for sensitive data and data beyond the 
maximum of 34 permitted PNR data 
elements. The EU team recommended 
to delete permanently the PNR data 
which were collected by CBP between 
28 May 2004 and the date the CBP 
started to ‘filter’ the data. The EU team 
further recommended to provide clearer 
guidance to CBP officers as to the 
meaning and interpretation of “serious 
crimes that are transnational in nature” 
                                                 
2 Commission Staff Working Paper on the 
Joint Review, 12.12.2005, revised version (see 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2006/jun/eu-
usa-pnr-com-review-2005.pdf). 
3 In the delegation list annexed to this 
document, all the names of these officials have 
been deleted. 
that form part of the purposes for which 
the CPB may collect PNR data.  
During the Joint Review, the US 
authorities submitted their intention to 
retain a sort of ‘pull’ system even after 
the change to a ‘push’ system was 
agreed upon in the Undertakings. On 
the basis of this report on the Joint 
Review, one can conclude that 
compliance of the US authorities with 
the agreements as adopted between US 
authorities and the EC is not a matter-
of-course. This is particularly worrying 
in light of the fact that EU officials 
assessing the level of US compliance of 
the Undertakings were not allowed to 
have full access to the relevant 
information and were forced to sign 
confidentiality agreements exposing 
them to US criminal sanctions for any 
breach.  
The ECJ judgment and its 
meaning 
The European Parliament, which has 
been marginalised in the rush to adopt 
the EU-US agreement, commenced 
proceedings before the ECJ to annul 
both the agreement between the 
European Communities and the US on 
the transfer of PNR data and also the 
Commission decision on the adequate 
protection of these data transferred to 
the Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection (the adequacy decision). It 
had already adopted a strongly worded 
report by MEP Boogerd-Quaak to this 
effect expressing doubts about the 
effectiveness of US data protection 
norms, but this opinion did not have any 
apparent effect.
4 In support of the 
Council, the Commission and the UK 
intervened. In support of the Parliament, 
the European Data Protection 
Supervisor participated formally in the 
proceedings.  
The judgment is very interesting for a 
number of reasons. The first is that at 
the very beginning, at paragraph 3, the 
first effective paragraph of the judgment 
the Court sets out the provision of the 
European Convention on Human Rights 
which states: “everyone has the right for 
respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence”. It 
continued with the second paragraph of 
Article 8 ECHR – the circumstances in 
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which a state may intervene with the 
right.  
To our knowledge it is unprecedented 
that the European Court of Justice, the 
court of the European Union, 
commences one of its judgments with a 
reference not to the law of the EU but to 
an international human rights agreement 
to which the EU is not even a party (nor 
has the power to become one at the 
moment). This is even more surprising 
in view of the fact that the ECJ does not 
then return to Article 8 European 
Convention on Human Rights at all in 
the judgment! Only one further 
reference is made to it at paragraph 62 
when the ECJ sets out the Parliament’s 
claim in favour of annulment of the EU-
US Agreement. One must ask then, 
what is the Court’s intention in setting 
its whole judgment in the framework of 
the human right to privacy yet never 
refers to it specifically? 
The European Parliament’s key 
complaint, couched in the words of 
competence and respect for its 
prerogatives, is that the EU-US 
agreement is too wide and constitutes 
an interference with the individual’s 
right to protection of his or her data. 
Further, it considers that the 
Commission’s adequacy decision was 
misguided at best. However, the Court 
chose to decide the whole case on a 
much more limited ground – the legal 
base on which the agreement and 
decision were founded. It never 
addressed the issue of the right to 
privacy and its application to the PNR 
arrangements, other than by 
commencing the whole ruling with that 
right!  
The Court held that both the EU-US 
agreement and the adequacy decision 
could not have their legal base in EU 
transport policy (a first pillar provision). 
Instead, on the basis of a careful reading 
of the preamble to the EU-US 
agreement, it found that its purpose is: 
a)  to enhance security; 
b)  to fight against terrorism; 
c)  to prevent and combat terrorism, 
and related crimes, other serious 
crimes , including organised crime; 
and 
d)  to prevent flight from warrants or 
custody for those crimes. 
On this basis the Court held that the 
transfer of PNR to the US authorities is 
a operation concerning public security 
and the activities of state authorities in 
the area of criminal law. Thus the Court 
held that the transfer of data falls within 
a framework established by the public 
authorities that relates to public 
security. For this reason the Court 
determined that the EC Directive 95/46 
on the protection of personal data was 
not relevant as the two acts are excluded 
by its Article 3(2), which states that it 
does not apply to activities in the 
second and third pillars and “in any case 
processing operations concerning public 
security, defence, State security and the 
activities of the State in areas of 
criminal law”. In view of the fact that 
the data would only be available to US 
law enforcement authorities and not EU 
authorities, this ground is difficult to 
reconcile with EU competences, the 
only ones that the ECJ is charged to 
protect. 
So, the EU-US agreement is annulled as 
is the Commission’s adequacy decision, 
but both on the ground that they are not 
first-pillar activities within the transport 
sector but belong elsewhere in the 
constitutional architecture of the EU. 
The question then is where do they 
belong? 
The wider implications for 
the architecture of the EU  
The current disarray in EU-US relations 
on PNR in part arises from the 
inadequacy of the current EU 
constitutional structure to provide a 
clear, precise and transparent legal base 
for the agreement. The attack by the 
European Parliament on this ground has 
resulted in the annulment of the 
agreement and the adequacy decision. 
Had the EU Constitutional Treaty been 
in force, the collapsing of the pillars of 
the Union would have meant that the 
incorrect legal base would have been 
less dramatic. While the Court would 
still have found that the provision on 
which the agreement was incorrectly 
based, a correct legal base would have 
been present in the same treaty (i.e. the 
Constitutional Treaty) and the 
substitution of one legal base for 
another would have been much easier. 
The participation of the European 
Parliament, the application of the EC 
Directive on data protection and access 
for the aggrieved individual to a remedy 
would have remained similar. The 
‘black hole’ of democratic deficit, 
accountability and protection of the 
individual would have been more 
limited. 
The PNR problem is a classic example 
of the extraordinarily complicated and 
ultimately untenable structure under 
which the EU currently operates. That 
an international agreement and 
adequacy decision could be founded on 
the wrong part of the EU structure and 
thus, after two years of operation be 
held to be illegal is highly frustrating 
for all involved, including the US. It 
bites at the principle of certainty of law 
and the effectiveness of the EU as a 
negotiating partner in international 
relations.  
However, the lack of support for the EU 
Constitution expressed by the negative 
referenda results in France and the 
Netherlands in May and June 2005, has 
meant that the reconstruction of the EU 
architecture has not gone ahead. The 
latest decision of the Council has been 
to extend the period of reflection for a 
further 12 months for the member states 
to consider the future. Notwithstanding 
this period of reflection, however, a 
number of member states have ratified 
the Constitutional Treaty since the 
French and Dutch referenda, indicating 
a positive approach at least in some 
parts of the Union.  
The choice of the third pillar – matters 
of policing and criminal law – for the 
new PNR agreement is not without 
problems. For one, in the third pillar the 
Parliament has even less voice than in 
the first pillar, so the result would be 
that the Parliament is effectively cut out 
of the picture. In the third pillar, there is 
highly heterogeneous control by the 
ECJ as its jurisdiction over third-pillar 
matters depends on whether each 
member state has made a declaration 
permitting its national courts (and not 
necessarily courts at the same level) to 
refer questions to the ECJ on third pillar 
issues. Some member states permit even 
first instance courts to refer third pillar 
questions to the ECJ (for instance Italy) 
whereas others permit no access to the 
Court (for instance the UK).
5 In any 
                                                 
5 See the table on declarations of EU Member 
States accepting the jurisdiction of the ECJ in 
the third pillar in: Elspeth Guild and Sergio 
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event, the ECJ’s finding that the 
exclusion provision in Article 3(2) of 
the data protection directive applies to 
the PNR agreement and the adequacy 
decision also has the effect of cutting 
the ECJ itself out of the picture, 
notwithstanding the heterogeneous rules 
of access to that court. 
No matter how one looks at it, the 
current situation is rather messy and 
unsatisfactory. The President of the 
Commission, Barroso has mentioned in 
an increasing number of speeches from 
May 2006, that the EU needs to use the 
passerelle provision of Article 42 Treaty 
on European Union to transfer the 
whole field of the third pillar into the 
first pillar (at Title IV EC). It remains to 
be seen whether this proposal will be 
taken up and if so by whom. The 
Commission has also used the 
possibility of bringing actions before 
the Court challenging measures on 
the ground that the legal base use 
is unlawful as regards various Council 
acts in the second and third pillars, 
claiming that since there is competence 
for them to be adopted in the first pillar, 
they must be adopted there. The most 
surprising of these actions is that in 
respect of the second pillar, where the 
Commission claims that a measure on 
small arms and light weapons adopted 
in the common foreign and security 
policy should have been adopted under 
the provisions of the ACP Agreement 
with countries in Africa, the Caribbean 
and Pacific.
6  
By itself, though, the collapsing of the 
first and third pillar might not be 
enough. While it would bring any future 
PNR decision within the first pillar and 
thus subject to the data protection 
directive, as the Court stated, the 
exception in that directive on public 
security, defence, State security and 
activities of the State in areas of 
criminal law applied, so the individual’s 
data might still not be subject to data 
protection. But, the Constitutional 
Treaty is not limited to the collapsing of 
the pillars; it also introduces the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights as a 
legally binding part of the EU 
framework. This means that the right to 
data protection as included in the 
Charter would be part of EU law and 
                                                          
Implications for the Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice, CEPS, October 2005. 
6 C-91/05. 
provide the individual with a right 
against unlawful data collection, 
transmission and manipulation. Thus, in 
order to resolve the PNR issues 
regarding protection of the individual’s 
data, in addition to the collapsing of the 
pillars, the EU also needs to give legally 
binding effect to the Charter in order to 
overcome the obstacles that the PNR 
decision has raised.  
Data protection 
The final choice for the legal basis of 
the PNR decision is extremely 
important, because in instances where 
there is an error or illegal activity, the 
data protection rights of the individual 
whose information has been collected, 
transferred, manipulated, and further 
transmitted depend critically on the 
legal status of the acts. If the European 
settlement on the right of the individual 
in respect of his or her personal data is 
higher than the US counterpart (which 
all parties agree), the individual in 
Europe will want to have European 
protection against manipulation of his 
or her data and not US protection which 
will be much lower. But this will 
depend on whether EU law which 
regulates the transmission of data is 
subject to European norms which the 
individual can access.  
It is disappointing that in this judgment, 
the ECJ on the one hand concluded that 
the collection of PNR data by the 
airlines falls within the scope of 
Community law and on the other hand 
seemed to accept that if the same data 
are to be transferred for public security 
reasons they no longer need the 
protection of the EC data protection 
directive. This conclusion, if accepted, 
will have much broader implications. 
For instance, it would mean that the 
transmission of information to third 
countries or organisations from the 
future Visa Information System or data 
on third-country nationals stored in SIS 
II (Schengen Information System) 
would escape the applicable rules of the 
EC directive on data protection, as long 
as this transmission is intended for 
police or public security use. In his 
initial reaction to the PNR judgment, 
the European Data Protection 
Supervisor, Mr. Hustinx, appropriately 
concluded that this reasoning of the ECJ 
would create a loophole in the 
protection of citizens. In this light, the 
PNR judgment contrasts with the more 
liberal approach of the ECJ in its earlier 
judgment in the Österreichischer 
Rundfunk case.
7 In this judgment, the 
ECJ explicitly declared that the 
applicability of the data protection 
Directive has to be interpreted broadly 
and should not be limited to data 
processing which is directly linked to 
the freedoms of free movement as 
protected in the EC Treaty.  
The paramount importance of data 
protection for every individual has been 
confirmed by its insertion as a 
fundamental right in the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights. In its explanatory 
memorandum to the proposal for a 
Framework Decision on third pillar data 
protection, the European Commission 
affirmed this by stating that the EC 
Directive 95/46 on data protection 
contains fundamental rules on the 
lawfulness of data processing as on the 
rights of data subjects.
8 According to 
the Commission, these fundamental 
principles should apply to data 
processing in the first and in the third 
pillar. Member states cannot simply 
circumvent principles, such as purpose 
limitation and the procedural guarantees 
as included in the EC Directive, by 
adopting rules that permit the use of 
first pillar information for third pillar 
purposes.  
In the Österreichischer Rundfunk case, 
the ECJ also referred to the applicability 
of Article 8 ECHR in relation to data 
processing in general. This means that 
the lawfulness of those decisions should 
be considered against the background of 
Article 8 ECHR. It is to be doubted 
whether the transmission of the 
extensive list of personal data to US 
authorities and the uncertainty about the 
future use of this information will pass 
the test of the criteria which have been 
developed by the European Court of 
Human Rights on the basis of Article 8 
ECHR.
9 So here the start of the 
judgment becomes somewhat clearer. If 
the EU data protection Directive does 
not apply to the PNR agreement 
because the directive is first pillar and 
the agreement is somewhere in a 
                                                 
7 Joined cases C-465/00, C-138/01 and C-
139/01. 
8 COM (2005) 475. 
9 See for example Rotaru v Romania, 4 May 
2000, appl. no. 28341/95 and the recent 
Segerstedt-Wiberg & ors v Sweden, 6 June 
2006, appl.no. 62332/00.  The Political Life of Data | 5 
common foreign and security policy 
(second pillar) or policing and 
cooperation in criminal matters (third 
pillar), the norm that applies will be the 
European human rights norm of the 
right to privacy contained in Article 8 of 
the ECHR. 
What about the individual?  
At the heart of the concerns about the 
transfer of data within the structure of 
the EU and EU-US relations is the 
justified concern of the EU to protect its 
citizens’ and residents’ rights. How can 
the individual make sure that his or her 
data are properly collected, transferred 
and only used for lawful purposes in 
accordance with EU (and ECHR) 
standards of the right of privacy and 
data protection? The problem raised by 
the PNR decision of the ECJ is what 
will happen to the aggrieved individual? 
Let us take the imaginary example of 
Mr Ali Mohammed, a Spanish national 
who seeks to board a plane from Madrid 
to New York. Let us say Mr 
Mohammed was born in Morocco and 
naturalised as a Spanish citizen five 
years ago. His data are transmitted to 
the US authorities in accordance with a 
new PNR agreement, made on the basis 
of the third pillar as it correctly stands. 
The US authorities, erroneously 
confusing Mr Mohammed with another 
Mr Mohammed who is on one of their 
terrorist lists, advise the airline to refuse 
him access to the plane which it does. 
As a result, the business meeting he was 
to have attended is cancelled and the 
multi-million euro deal falls through. 
Does Mr Mohammed have any remedy 
against what has happened to him, 
which (again let us suppose) all agree is 
the result of a negligent mistake? 
Under the rules applicable to air travel, 
it is very unlikely that he will have a 
cause of action against the airline on the 
basis of breach of contract. Because his 
data were transmitted in accordance 
with the agreement, the airline company 
is protected against a breach of contract 
claim.
10 It would be a matter of US law 
as to whether he would have an action 
against the US authorities. He might 
potentially have the possibility to sue 
                                                 
10 It may be open to the individual, however, 
to start an action with the purpose of seeking 
the national judge to make a preliminary 
reference to the ECJ on whether the data 
transmission and effects were lawful. 
the EU institutions (within the time 
limits) under Article 230 EC claiming 
that his individual rights are directly 
affected by the agreement with the US. 
However, the scope of Article 230 has 
been very narrowly interpreted by the 
ECJ and it is very much of a long shot, 
considering that in any event he would 
have to sue within two months of the 
publication of the measure. 
Finally, Mr Mohammed would be able 
to take his case to the European Court 
of Human Rights in an action against 
Spain for permitting the transmission of 
his data unlawfully and contrary to his 
right to respect for his private life under 
Article 8 ECHR. Should the European 
Court of Human Rights find in his 
favour, then the whole EU-US system 
would once again be condemned, this 
time for a failure to protect human 
rights. Such a decision would be even 
more problematic for the architecture of 
the EU than the ECJ’s decision on PNR. 
However, this possible legal action is 
the only one that is not surrounded by 
question marks as to whether Mr 
Mohammed could in fact access it. But, 
this remedy is outside EU law. The lack 
of clear accessible EU remedies for 
passengers against the transmission and 
use of their personal information is 
difficult to reconcile with the generally 
accepted principle that everyone whose 
rights under EU law have been violated 
should have an effective remedy: a 
principle that is repeatedly confirmed in 
the judgments of the ECJ and inserted 
in Article 47 of the EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights.
11 
An isolated issue? 
The issue of the transfer of PNR data to 
US authorities is not unique. US 
authorities obtain, or are trying to 
obtain, access to personal data of EU 
citizens and persons residing in the EU 
in more than one way. Of course, the 
most recent example is the revelation of 
the fact that since 2001, US authorities, 
including the CIA, have been allowed 
access to confidential information on 
international banking transfers of EU 
customers held by the Belgian bank 
consortium SWIFT.
12 The initial 
                                                 
11 Johnston v Chief Constable of the RUC, C-
222/84; Panayotova, C-327/02. 
12 Eric Lichtblau and James Risen, “Bank Data 
Sifted in Secret by U.S. to Block Terror”, The 
New York Times, 23 June 2006. 
statements from a spokesperson of the 
European Commission and the Belgian 
government that this transfer of 
personal data does not fall either within 
the ambit of the EC Directive or the 
Belgian data protection law constitute a 
clear and alarming example of the 
actual gap in data protection. 
During the EU-US informal High Level 
meeting on Freedom, Security and 
Justice on 2-3 March 2006, in Vienna, 
the US officials mentioned, in the 
context of fighting terrorists’ use of the 
Internet, that they were “considering 
approaching each Member State to 
ensure that the data collected on the 
basis of the recently adopted Directive 
on data retention would be accessible to 
them”.
13 During the same meeting the 
US officials warned against the 
adoption of the draft framework 
decision on the protection of personal 
data in the third pillar. The US 
delegation expressed its concerns about 
the “negative impact of the draft 
framework decision on data protection 
on its bilateral relations with Member 
States if it was to be adopted in its 
present form”. This concern regarded 
the draft Article 15 of the proposal 
which includes special requirements 
with regard to the transfer of data to 
authorities in third countries or to 
international bodies. This example in 
fact demonstrates the need for the EU 
legislator to provide uniform and 
stringent rules with regard to the 
transmission of personal data to third 
countries and that the level of this 
protection should not be determined by 
US counterparts.  
The framework decision on data 
protection in the third pillar is a step 
forward in providing a certain level of 
protection in the field of police and 
judicial cooperation. Still, it is 
questionable whether the ‘loophole’ of 
data protection, as described above, will 
be solved by a swift adoption of this 
proposal. Instead of reinforcing the 
rights of individuals, this proposal still 
seems more focused on extending the 
possibilities for transmitting personal 
information to other authorities and 
authorities in third countries. Further, 
the adoption of this Framework 
                                                 
13 EU Council, Report of the EU-US informal 
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Decision will not change the lack of 
competence for the ECJ to assess the 
lawfulness and proportionality of the 
data processing involved. A more 
appropriate solution would be to extend 
the applicability of the EC Directive on 
data protection to the whole field 
covered by EU law by amending Article 
3(2) to provide more strictly for the 
exceptions. It might be necessary to 
provide for more specified rules for 
concrete situations, but the basic 
principles as provided in the EC 
Directive should be considered as a 
minimum level of data protection. The 
rights contained therein should only be 
restricted in accordance with these 
principles and the criteria as developed 
on the basis of Article 8 ECHR. Finally, 
the EU Charter needs to be given legal 
effect so that the rights of privacy and 
data protection contained in it can 
provide a legal basis for the balancing 
of the individual’s rights against the 
state’s interest in access to and use of 
the data. 
Some recommendations to 
resolve the problems raised 
by the decision 
Architectural solutions 
The best option is for the member states 
to ratify the Constitutional Treaty 
immediately. This would both collapse 
the pillar structure and insert the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights into the 
heart of the EU structure as legally 
binding, thereby protecting data as a 
fundamental right. The next best option 
would be for the Council to agree to a 
rapid use of Article 42 TEU to move the 
third pillar into the first pillar and thus 
create one streamlined structure for the 
two pillars. Whether this will be 
possible remains to be seen. This action 
would solve both the problem of the 
legality of the measure and the 
applicability of the data protection 
Directive. It would not solve the 
problem of the adequacy of the data 
protection Directive, for which, a 
legally binding EU Charter on 
Fundamental Rights would be necessary 
as well. 
Remedies for the individual 
If the architectural solutions are adopted 
(either the ratification of the 
Constitution or the collapsing of the 
pillars combined with legal force to the 
Charter), the individual would come 
within the normal rules of EU legal 
remedies. He or she would be able to 
start an action in the national court 
against the national authorities on the 
basis of the data protection Directive 
which requires that the individual has a 
legal remedy for any breach of the 
rights guaranteed by the applicable 
national law. Alternatively, if the matter 
still falls within the Directive´s 
exceptions, his claim could be based on 
the right to privacy and data protection 
in the Charter. If the national judge was 
in doubt about the use of the data at 
stake, then he or she could refer the 
matter to the ECJ via the preliminary 
proceedings based on 234 EC. Without 
the Constitution, the narrow 
interpretation of Article 230 EC makes 
a direct action of the individual before 
the ECJ against the decision of the 
Council and the Commission not a 
likely solution. However, the ECJ could 
widen its interpretation of that provision 
to permit a recourse in this situation. A 
solution within the EU, however, is 
highly desirably as the alternative is the 
potentially very damaging possibility of 
a judgment from the European Court of 
Human Rights striking down an EU-US 
agreement on human rights grounds. 
However one looks at the PNR issue 
and beyond it to the different 
philosophies of the EU and US on data 
protection, the issue is now firmly on 
the political agenda. The legal 
constraints of the EU, tied up with a 
European understanding of human 
rights as encompassing the right of the 
individual to control of his or her data, 
lead inexorably to conflict with the US 
authorities, which consider data as the 
property of the individual or authority 
which collects them. Data have 
acquired a political life of their own, 
which has opened new fissures in EU-
US relations. 
 
 